



COMPTROLLER
(Administration)

Approved For Release 2003/05/27 : CIA-RDP84-00780R006100130038-2
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

ABC 74-0540

DD/M&S

74-1089

DDM&S Registry

Security 5

22 MAR 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR Mr. John S. Warner
General Counsel
Central Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT: Use of Polygraph for Department of Defense Personnel
Assigned to CIA

John,

This is in reply to your memorandum on the above subject dated
February 15, 1974.

We agree with your request that the exemption to the Federal
Personnel Manual restriction on polygraph for those competitive
service civilian employees detailed to your Agency be continued
for another year. I have attached a copy of our request in this
respect to the Civil Service Commission for your reference.

We do not feel that it is appropriate to request changes in the
Federal Personnel Manual requirement for annual renewal of
exceptions to polygraph policy in conjunction with this action.
I will have my people look into this with the CSC staff and we will
keep you apprised of the results.

DO

D. O. Cooke
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense

Attachment

OGC Rec'd 3/26/74

Distribution:

1-DDM&S

1-Acting Director of Security

1-General Counsel



COMPTROLLER
(Administration)

Approved For Release 2003/05/27 : CIA-RDP84-00780R006100130038-2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

82C - 74-0540

22 MAR 1974

Honorable Robert E. Hampton
Chairman
U. S. Civil Service Commission
Washington, D.C. 20415

Dear Mr. Hampton:

Reference is made to (1) Appendix D, Subchapter 736, Federal Personnel Manual, and (2) to your letter dated April 17, 1973, in which you authorized the Secretary of Defense to use polygraph examinations for certain employees involved in intelligence and counterintelligence activities directly relating to national security (copy enclosed).

It is requested that the authority granted in your letter, cited above, be extended for one year beginning April 17, 1974. The conditions which we certified in our letter of March 14, 1973, continue to exist. That is, the intelligence or counterintelligence missions directly affecting the national security continue, and those competitive career employees subject to polygraph examinations will be involved in such intelligence or counterintelligence activities.

Sincerely,

(Signed D. O. Cooke)

D. O. Cooke
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense

Enclosure

STAT

Approved For Release 2003/05/27 : CIA-RDP84-00780R006100130038-2

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SECRET

Approved For Release 2003/05/27 : CIA-RDP84-00780R006100130038-2

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

OGC 74-0295

DD/MES Registry

File Security 3

15 February 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable David O. Cooke
Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Washington, D. C. 20301

SUBJECT: Use of Polygraph for Department of
Defense Personnel Assigned to CIA

1. You will recall that last year you and I discussed the question of CIA administering polygraph examinations for Department of Defense personnel detailed to the Central Intelligence Agency. You very kindly went to work and secured an appropriate exemption from the U. S. Civil Service Commission under date of 17 April 1973 for a period of one year.

2. I am once again asking you to request an exemption from the Commission; the justification is the same as given to you last year. It also occurs to me that, since I cannot foresee a change in this situation, it might be possible to obtain an open-ended exemption for say three to five years rather than for one year.

3. We here in the Agency do appreciate your understanding and cooperation in this matter.



JOHN S. WARNER
General Counsel

25X1

25X1

cc: DDM&S
Director of Security

SECRET

Approved For Release 2003/05/27 : CIA-RDP84-00780R006100130038-2

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OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	DDM&S		
2	<div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 100px; height: 20px;"></div>	2/20	<i>[Signature]</i>
3	Mr. Blake		
4	<i>Registry</i>		
5			
6			

<input type="checkbox"/> ACTION	<input type="checkbox"/> DIRECT REPLY	<input type="checkbox"/> PREPARE REPLY
<input type="checkbox"/> APPROVAL	<input type="checkbox"/> DISPATCH	<input type="checkbox"/> RECOMMENDATION
<input type="checkbox"/> COMMENT	<input type="checkbox"/> FILE	<input type="checkbox"/> RETURN
<input type="checkbox"/> CONCURRENCE	<input type="checkbox"/> INFORMATION	<input type="checkbox"/> SIGNATURE

Remarks:

*Mr. Brownman & Mr. Blake informed
 2/21/74*

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
General Counsel	2/15/74

OGC 73-0825

DD/M&S Registry
File *Security 5*

10 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security

SUBJECT: Use of Polygraph for DoD Personnel
Assigned to the Agency

1. You will recall that on 21 December 1972 the Director of DIA forwarded a memorandum to the Director of Central Intelligence stating he was withdrawing the commitment to the Agency providing blanket authorization to conduct polygraph examination of DIA personnel assigned to NPIC. He gave his reasons including a new DoD Directive which in turn was based on the Civil Service Commission regulation.
2. The undersigned was in touch with Mr. David O. Cooke, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Administration), who had issued the DoD Directive and as a result of a meeting with him early this year he agreed with our view that the Civil Service Commission could grant exceptions and that exceptions seemed warranted in the case of all DoD people assigned or detailed to CIA. Mr. Cooke undertook to secure such an exemption and on 8 May 1973 I received from Mr. Cooke a copy of the Civil Service Commission document granting the exemption dated 17 April 1973, copy attached.
3. Under the procedures existing at the time, Mr. Tweedy in early January contacted Admiral de Poix asking that his position in his memorandum to the Director of Central Intelligence be held in abeyance while we worked with DoD in securing the Civil Service Commission exception. At this time I am not sure exactly what the channel is from the Agency to de Poix but presumably the appropriate official of the Agency should close the circuit in this case by advising DIA of the new

Civil Service Commission exemption. Also for consideration is the fact that the Civil Service Commission exemption is granted DoD only for the period of one year from the date of their letter and terminates automatically unless a request for further approval is made in writing. At this stage these two matters do not seem to be legal matters and it may be that Security can handle them or possibly communication should be from the Deputy Director for Management and Services. It is also possible that Executive Secretary, CIA Management Committee would wish to handle the matter. In any event, copies of the 21 December 1972 memorandum to the Director of Central Intelligence were sent by [redacted] for General Walters to DDS for Director of Security, DDI for Director, NPIC, Executive Director, and General Counsel. Copies of this memorandum will be sent to the DDM&S, DDI and Executive Secretary, CIA Management Committee.

STA

STA

[redacted]
JOHN S. WARNER
Deputy General Counsel

Attachment

cc: ES, CIA Mgt Com
DDI
✓DDM&S



WASHINGTON, D.C. 20415

APR 17 1973

YOUR REFERENCE

Mr. D. O. Cooke
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
Office of the Assistant Secretary
of Defense
Washington, D. C. 20301

Dear Mr. Cooke:

This is in response to your letter of March 14, 1973, requesting that the Secretary of Defense be granted authority to use polygraph examinations for certain categories of competitive service employees who will be assigned to work in intelligence or counter-intelligence activities directly affecting the national security.

In accordance with the provisions of Appendix D, Chapter 736, Federal Personnel Manual, the Secretary of Defense is hereby granted authority to use polygraph examinations for competitive service employees in the following categories:

Approximately ten Defense Intelligence Agency competitive career employees who will work in a joint Central Intelligence Agency - Defense Intelligence Agency intelligence production.

Those competitive career employees of the Defense agencies who are to be assigned for training in the Department-wide Intelligence Training and Career Development Program with the Defense Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency.


Those competitive career employees assigned to ad hoc study groups and task forces involving highly sensitive intelligence projects where they will work with excepted service employees who are subject to polygraph examinations.

Those competitive career employees assigned or detailed to the Central Intelligence Agency in activities where polygraph examination is required by the Central Intelligence Agency.

This authority is extended to the Secretary of Defense with the restriction that he or his designee will consider the circumstances of each individual case with due regard for the rights of the specific employee and that he or his designee will permit the polygraph examination for employment screening and personnel investigations of competitive service employees only after he has verified that the agency conducting the examination will follow the procedures for administering the polygraph as set forth in Appendix D-3, Chapter 736 of the Federal Personnel Manual.

This approval is granted for a period of one year from the date of this letter, and will terminate automatically unless, prior to that time, a request for further approval is made in writing recertifying the intelligence or counter-intelligence mission directly affecting the national security, and that those competitive career employees subject to polygraph examination will be involved in such intelligence or counter-intelligence activities.

Sincerely yours,


Robert E. Hampton
Chairman

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

UNCLASSIFIED	CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET
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OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	DDM&S 7D18	5/14	[Signature]
2	Mr. Hattler (F9I)		Pu
3			
4			
5			
6	Registry (to file)		

ACTION	DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL	DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT	FILE	RETURN
CONCURRENCE	INFORMATION	SIGNATURE

Remarks:

1 to 2: I have discussed OGC memo with [redacted] who agrees that OS will maintain yearly surprise to follow up with DOB and CSC. Oz will probably mention this at morning meeting, 15 May - no further action necessary on our part. P

5/14/73

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
OGC 7 D 01 Hqs [redacted]	5/10/73

16 Feb 73



The top package is what
Helen sent up and seems
to put the action back in
Security. Shall we follow-
up with OS?

K.

no

*file -
suspense
27 Feb 73*

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL		SECRET	
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP					
TO	NAME AND ADDRESS		DATE	INITIALS	
1	Director of Personnel		15 FEB 1973	AD-	
2	DDP Per		15 FEB 1973	VW	
3	AD Per			WBF	
4					
5					
6					
ACTION		DIRECT REPLY		PREPARE REPLY	
APPROVAL		DISPATCH		RECOMMENDATION	
COMMENT		FILE		RETURN	
CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION		SIGNATURE	

DD / S REGISTRY
FILE Security 5

Remarks:

FYI.



John S. Warner

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.

DATE

Deputy General Counsel 7D01 Hqs

2/14/73

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FORM NO.
1-67

237

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(40)

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OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	Director of Security		
2			
3	Deputy General Counsel		
4			
5			
6			

ACTION	DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL	DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT	FILE	RETURN
CONCURRENCE	INFORMATION	SIGNATURE

Remarks:

As you can see from the attachments, DoD has asked for our assistance in preparing their letter to the Civil Service Commission regarding the use of the polygraph for certain DoD employees. I have made several suggestions and changes in Mr. Cooke's letter and I believe they are self-explanatory. I would like your concurrence before I send the package over to Mr. Cooke.

John S. Warner

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.

DATE

Deputy General Counsel 7D01 Hqs

2/14/73

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FORM NO. 1-67

237

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DRAFT
OGC:JSW:mks
13 February 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. David O. Cooke
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Administration)

Doc:

I am returning the attachments in your memorandum of 12 February 1973. I have made several adjustments to your proposed letter to Mr. Hampton and to Joe Liebling's suggested additional paragraph for your letter.

1. I would add the following to your second paragraph:

"Further, from time to time, there are employees from other components of DoD who are assigned or detailed to CIA and, in line with their policies, the Agency wishes to continue polygraphing of individuals assigned or detailed to the Agency from other parts of the government in line with the procedures applicable to all CIA employees."

You will recall I mentioned that, in fact, there are other assignments and details other than from DIA and these should be appropriately covered.

2. In lieu of the last two sentences suggested by Joe Liebling, I would recommend the following:

"The CIA has suggested that any queries concerning their procedures regarding the use of the polygraph be made directly to that Agency."

A careful reading of Appendix D of FPM 736 would indicate that it did not contemplate the situation at hand, namely assignment or detail of an individual from one agency of government who is in the competitive service to CIA which is statutorily exempted from the competitive service. Appendix D refers to use of the polygraph for "...employment screening and personnel investigations of applicants for and appointees to competitive service positions...." In the actual situation, of course, the individual would neither be denied employment nor removed from his position as a result of use of the polygraph if any problems were to develop and he would simply remain in the position he had been occupying and would not be assigned or detailed to the Agency. Consequently, while we are happy to discuss this situation with the Civil Service Commission and, of course, would brief them thoroughly on our procedures regarding the use of the polygraph, we do not wish to be placed in the position of submitting our regulations to them. I can assure you that our regulations in fact contain all of the safeguards and precautions required by Appendix D.

Please let me know if we can be of any further assistance.

John S. Warner
Deputy General Counsel

Attachments



COMPTROLLER

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

February 12, 1973

(Administration)

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. JOHN WARNER, DEPUTY GENERAL COUNSEL,
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

John:

Attached is the proposed request for my signature to Bob Hampton on polygraphs.

Also, attached are the views of the DASD (Security Policy) that the proposed letter is deficient because it does not furnish any information on the manner in which polygraph examinations will be conducted.

I am sending the package over to you because in an unguarded moment at Maury Lanman's farewell party you offered to take a hand in the matter.

I would appreciate your suggestions and, of course, a return of the attachments.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Doc".

D. O. Cooke
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense

Attachments



OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

COMPTROLLER

(Administration)

Honorable Robert E. Hampton
Chairman
U.S. Civil Service Commission
Washington, D.C. 20415

Dear Mr. Hampton:

Reference Appendix D, Subchapter 736, Federal Personnel Manual.

As you know, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) is engaged in a highly sensitive intelligence mission directly affecting the national security. The DIA civilian workforce, with very few exceptions, are excepted service personnel and the cited Federal Personnel Manual reference does not apply to them. There are, however, approximately ten DIA employees who are competitive career and who work in a joint CIA-DIA intelligence production activity and who do come under the requirements of the cited reference.

Additionally, the DIA and the National Security Agency (NSA), an exempted organization, are DOD agents in a Department-wide Intelligence Training and Career Development Program. This program will require competitive career civilian employees of the military services and the Defense agencies to be assigned for varying periods of time to these two agencies for training. The training will require the trainees to participate in highly sensitive intelligence production functions in both agencies with excepted service employees. Further, national security needs frequently require ad hoc study groups and task forces composed of competitive career employees of the military services and Defense agencies and excepted service employees to work together in highly sensitive intelligence projects.

Accordingly, it is requested that the Secretary of Defense be granted the authority to use polygraph examinations for the categories of competitive

service employees mentioned above. It should be understood that this authority will be exercised by the Secretary of Defense or his designees on an individual basis after thorough and careful considerations indicate the need for these examinations.

D. O. Cooke
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense



COMPTROLLER

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

26 JAN 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. D. O. COOKE

SUBJECT: Letter to Chairman, Civil Service Commission
On Use of Polygraph


The proposed letter is not in conformity with Appendix D, Sub-Chapter 736, Federal Personnel Manual. One purpose of this portion of the Manual is to insure that the use of the polygraph as a screening device or as part of a personnel security investigation is restricted to positions related to a highly sensitive intelligence or counterintelligence mission directly affecting the national security. Another and equally important purpose is to insure that the agency conducting the examination has published regulations designed to safeguard the rights of the employees.

While the letter does contain a sufficient statement of mission to justify the need for the requested authority, it does not furnish any information on the manner in which polygraph examinations are conducted or identify the agency which will conduct them. Without such information, which is required by paragraph D-3, the Commission cannot be expected to make a determination as to whether the procedures to be followed afford adequate safeguards to the employees.

Accordingly, we recommend that the proposed letter identify the agencies which will conduct the polygraph examinations and either provide copies of the appropriate regulations or state how they may be obtained. If the examinations are conducted by CIA and NSA, the DoD and NSA regulations should be attached, and the Commission should be told that information concerning the CIA regulation must be obtained from that agency.

We suggest that a paragraph, in language substantially as follows, be added to the proposed letter in order to furnish the Commission the necessary information:

"These polygraph examinations will be conducted by the NSA and CIA. A copy of the NSA regulation governing the use of the polygraph and the DoD regulation to which it refers are attached. The CIA regulations are not available for submission. The CIA has suggested that any inquiries concerning such regulations be made directly to that Agency."


Joseph J. Liebling
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Security Policy)

Appendix D. Use of the Polygraph in Personnel Investigations of Competitive Service Applicants and Appointees to Competitive Service Positions

D-1. AGENCIES WHICH MAY USE THE POLYGRAPH

An executive agency which has a highly sensitive intelligence or counterintelligence mission directly affecting the national security (e.g., a mission approaching the sensitivity of that of the Central Intelligence Agency) may use the polygraph for employment screening and personnel investigations of applicants for and appointees to competitive service positions only after complying with the procedures in D-2 below.

D-2. DETERMINING WHETHER AGENCY MISSION MEETS CRITERIA

OK! The executive agency must submit to the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission a statement of the nature of its mission. The Chairman shall then determine whether the agency has an intelligence or counterintelligence mission directly affecting the national security.

D-3. REVIEW OF AGENCY REGULATIONS AND DIRECTIVES

Directive must be reviewed by CSC The agency shall prepare regulations and directives governing use of the polygraph in employment screening and personnel investigations which must be reviewed by the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission. These shall contain as a minimum:

OK (1) Specific purposes for which the polygraph may be used, and details concerning the types of positions or organizational entities in which it will be used, and the officials authorized to approve these examinations.

(2) A directive that a person to be examined must be informed as far in advance as possible of the intent to use the polygraph and of—

- (a) Other devices or aids to the interrogation which may be used simultaneously with the polygraph, such as voice recordings.
- (b) His privilege against self-incrimination and his right to consult with legal counsel or to secure other professional assistance prior to the examination.
- (c) The effect of the polygraph examination, or his refusal to take this examination, on his eligibility for employment. He shall be informed that refusal to consent to a polygraph examination will not be made a part of his personnel file.
- (d) The characteristics and nature of the polygraph machine and examination, including an explanation of the physical operation of the machine, the procedures to be followed during the examination, and the disposition of information developed.
- (e) The general areas of all questions to be asked during an examination.

(3) A directive that no polygraph examination will be given unless the person to be examined has voluntarily consented in writing to be examined after having been informed of the above, (a) through (e).

(4) A directive that questions to be asked during a polygraph examination must have specific relevance to the subject of the particular inquiry.

(5) Adequate standards for the selection and training of examiners, keeping in mind the Government's objective of insuring protection

for the subject of an examination and the accuracy of polygraph results.

(6) A provision for adequate monitoring of polygraph operations by a high-level official to prevent abuses or unwarranted invasions of privacy.

(7) A provision for adequate safeguarding of files, charts, and other relevant data developed through polygraph examinations to avoid unwarranted invasions of privacy.

D-1. RESTRICTION ON APPROVAL TO USE THE POLYGRAPH

Approval to use the polygraph will be granted only for 1-year periods. An agency given approval to use the polygraph for competitive service positions will be required to recertify annually that the conditions which led to the original certification still exist in the agency. ✓

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TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	Deputy Director for Support	10 JAN 1973	[Signature]
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ACTION		DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL		DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT		FILE	RETURN
CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION	SIGNATURE
Remarks: From the attached it will be seen that we appeared to get a good reception on this problem. Larry and I have both talked to Bronson Tweedy with a view that he would telephone Admiral de Poix suggesting that his memorandum be held in abeyance pending the outcome of the over-all problem. Also, I would think that strong representations should be made with Civil Service Commission in support of DoD's request for exception. I will work directly with D/Personnel on this.			
<div style="border: 1px solid black; display: inline-block; width: 150px; height: 20px; margin-bottom: 5px;"></div> John S. Warner			
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER			
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.			DATE
OGC 7 D 01 Hqs x []			1/4/73
UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL	

Re JWC's note #2, D/Pers
is on distribution for a copy
of the 3 Jan MFR -- I'm
not sure about the Routing
Slip.

p.

DD/S 73-0059

3 January 1973

DD / S R E G I S T R Y

FILE *Security 3*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Polygraph Examination of DoD Civilian Employees
and Military Personnel

1. On 3 January 1973, Mr. [redacted] Chief,
Personnel Security Division, and Mr. John S. Warner, Deputy
General Counsel, met at the Department of Defense with the
following people:

STA

David O. Cooke, Deputy Assistant Secretary (Administration)
Joseph J. Liebling, Deputy Assistant Secretary (Security Policy)
Charles M. Trammell, Jr., Security Plans and Programs Division

The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the memorandum issued
by Mr. Cooke on 30 October 1972. That memorandum in effect
stated that no civilian employees or applicants for employment by
any part of the Department of Defense would be subjected to a
polygraph whether by DoD or any other agency of government.
Subsequently, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)
issued a memorandum of 21 December 1972 stating that in view of
the Cooke directive not only would no civilian DoD employee assigned
to NPIC be polygraphed but no military would be polygraphed.

2. Mr. Cooke and his associates were apparently well aware
of the history of the polygraph issue with regard to DoD personnel
assigned to NPIC. When queried as to why the 30 October 1972
directive by its terms did not apply to NSA, they pointed out that
the Civil Service Commission had issued a regulation which prohibited
the use of polygraph for employees of the competitive service and
since NSA was exempt by law they were accordingly exempted from
the 30 October directive.

3. Mr. Cooke volunteered that he had not coordinated his 30 October 1972 directive in any way with the Agency. Mr. Warner pointed out that the practical and security considerations applicable to the exemption for NSA indeed certainly apply to CIA and, in fact, in some ways more so. We made it clear that we were not merely talking about the mix of civilian and military assigned to NPIC, but we were also talking about details to other parts of the Agency. We also made it clear we were not talking about the smaller DIA and Army units in NPIC as distinguished from DC-2 personnel. They inquired if there were civilians assigned or detailed to the Agency other than in the NPIC complex and we indicated that even if there were none currently there were plans to do so.

4. After considerable discussion, Mr. Cooke volunteered that DoD would apply to the Civil Service Commission for an exception for those civilian employees of DoD who were assigned to intelligence activities of the CIA. There is provision in the Civil Service regulation for exceptions to the ban on polygraph for employees involved in intelligence activities. Mr. Cooke directed Mr. Trammell to prepare an appropriate draft requesting this exception and said this would be coordinated with the Agency prior to signature. They indicated their wish and desire that we support this request for exception in an appropriate way.

5. As to the DIA memorandum of 21 December 1972, Mr. Cooke suggested that we merely inform the Director of DIA that there were steps being taken to get an exception from the Commission for civilian employees. It was recognized also that DIA on its own included the ban on use of the polygraph to be applicable to the military. Mr. Cooke suggested that on the basis of the steps being taken, we could persuade DIA to hold its request in abeyance.

STA

JOHN S. WARNER
Deputy General Counsel

cc: Executive Director-Comptroller

✓DDS

D/Security

D/Personnel

Lej -

need info on the
de Poix paper ref
polygraph - where
else sent in Agency,
advance notice,
proposed action - - -

discussed with
DD/S 12/27/72
DD/S will discuss
further with DD/S on
12/29 - P

JWC
27 DEC 1972

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OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP			
TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	<i>DD/S</i>	27 DEC 72	LDP/ms
2			
3	<i>DD/Security</i>		
4	Attn: Rm 4E60, Hqs		
5			
6			
ACTION		DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL		DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT		FILE	RETURN
CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION	SIGNATURE
Remarks: <i>EE DISTRIBUTION</i> <i>ORIG - A/DCI</i> 1 to 3 - <i>cc - Ex DIR</i> - Per our discussion, DD/S <i>cc - BGC</i> is very interested in your thoughts <i>cc - NPIC via DD/S</i> about this matter and the actions you <i>cc - D/SEC via DD/S</i> recommend. Att cc: Director of Personnel, w/cy of Att			
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER			
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.			DATE
<i>Acting DCL</i>			<i>12/26/72</i>
UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET

FORM NO. 1-67 237 Use previous editions

(40)

EO-DD/S:LDP/ms (27 Dec 72)


Distribution:

Orig RS - DD/Sec, w/cy of Att (DD/S 72-4750) (by hand)

1 - DD/S Chrono

1 - DD/S Subject, w/Att ✓

Noted by DD/S
on 12/26/72.DD/S 72-4750: Cy of Memo dtd 21 Dec 72 to the Director fr the Director,
DIA, subj: Polygraph Examinations of DIA Employees Assigned to the



DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

Executive Registry

72-6539

21 DEC 1972

FOUO-78,867/DS-6C1

SUBJECT: Polygraph Examinations of DIA Employees Assigned to the
National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC)

TO: Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC 20505

1. Effective this date, I am compelled to withdraw a previous commitment to your agency which provided blanket authorization to conduct polygraph examinations of DIA personnel assigned to the NPIC (Building #213).
2. Cancellation of this agreement, entered into verbally in 1964 by Mr. McNamara, then Secretary of Defense and Mr. McCone, then Director, Central Intelligence, is predicated on a recent Department of Defense directive relating to polygraph examination of civilian employees. One of the provisions therein directs that no DoD department or agency shall allow another U.S. Government agency to polygraph its employees as a screening or selection device or as a condition for employment.
3. The directive does not exclude DoD elements from conducting consensual polygraph examinations as authorized on a case-by-case basis in a specific counterintelligence or criminal matter. Consequently, should any such case arise relating to any of our personnel assigned to your area at the NPIC, I may authorize the use of the polygraph if deemed appropriate and if the individual concerned agrees.
4. Although the DoD directive addresses itself to the polygraphing of civilian employees and applicants, it is my interpretation that no use of double standards was intended and, therefore, I will exclude military personnel from polygraph examination as a condition for assignment to the NPIC.

V. P. de POIX

V. P. de POIX
Vice Admiral, USN
Director

DD/S Distribution:

- 1 - DD/S Subject ✓
- 1 - D/Sec -- Attn: Mr.
- 1 - Director of Personnel

Your Meeting

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